By Okey IBEKE
Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar’s promise to reopen Nigeria’s land borders if elected president in 2027 may appeal to traders and border communities who depend on cross-border commerce. But the promise raises a more important question: what exactly does he intend to reopen?
The Federal Government has challenged the premise of the proposal, insisting that Nigeria’s borders are not closed. Minister of Interior Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo recalled that Seme, Illela, Maigatari and Mfum borders were reopened in December 2020, followed by Idiroko and Ikom for goods and services in April 2022. The present administration also opened Kamba and Tsamiya borders in Kebbi State in February 2026.
Atiku reportedly made his promise on August 26 while receiving a political support group in Abuja. He said he would reopen the land borders and develop southern ports to boost trade if elected in 2027, arguing that restrictions had hurt legitimate trans-border commerce, contributed to business failures and pushed some young entrepreneurs into unemployment.
There is undoubtedly a case for making Nigeria’s border administration more efficient. Border communities depend on trade with neighbouring countries, while Nigerian businesses need access to regional markets. Unnecessary delays, poor infrastructure, excessive bureaucracy and multiple checkpoints are already being addressed. Legitimate traders should be able to move their goods without avoidable obstacles.
But legitimate trade is not the same as smuggling.
The fact that Nigerians have traded across these borders for generations does not, by itself, make every such activity lawful. Trade is legitimate when it complies with the law: goods are brought through approved entry points, properly declared and documented, applicable duties and taxes are paid, and the relevant regulations are observed.
A trader who meets those requirements is engaged in legitimate commerce. Someone who avoids approved routes, conceals goods, evades duties or brings prohibited commodities into the country is smuggling, irrespective of how long the practice has existed.
This distinction matters because compliant businesses already bear the costs of operating within the law. Importers and manufacturers pay duties, taxes, regulatory charges, transportation costs and other expenses. Allowing competitors to evade those obligations gives the law-abiding businessman a disadvantage and distorts the market. This is why the Nigeria Customs Service is simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade, protecting government revenue and enforcing import and export regulations. Its growing use of automation, risk management and digital processing is aimed at reducing friction for compliant traders while improving the detection of suspicious transactions. The sensible objective, therefore, is smarter border administration that makes lawful commerce easier without giving illicit trade room to flourish.
There is also a security dimension that any serious border policy must confront. Nigeria’s borders are vulnerable to the movement of arms, narcotics, trafficked persons and other illicit goods, while some restrictions have been imposed specifically because of terrorism and insecurity. Tunji-Ojo made this point in responding to Atiku’s references to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin. He explained that the Banki and Amchidé crossings with Cameroon were closed in 2014 because of the Boko Haram insurgency, rather than because of the 2019 trade policy. Some crossings were subsequently reopened following security and stabilisation efforts involving Nigeria and neighbouring countries.
That history makes it difficult to treat border management as simply a matter of removing economic restrictions. A crossing that is commercially useful can also be exploited by criminal networks, making security considerations an unavoidable part of any decision to relax controls.
If Atiku’s proposal is to simplify documentation, improve infrastructure, eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy, strengthen regional trade and make it easier for legitimate small-scale traders to operate, then those objectives are difficult to oppose. They are consistent with Nigeria’s efforts to deepen regional commerce under the African Continental Free Trade Area.
But if “reopening the borders” means changing the rules that distinguish legitimate commerce from illicit activity, Nigerians deserve to know.
Which controls would be removed? Which duties would change? Would Customs declarations remain compulsory? Would prohibited goods remain prohibited? How would legitimate businesses be protected from cheaper smuggled alternatives? And what safeguards would remain against the movement of arms, narcotics and other illicit commodities?
These questions are not technicalities. They are the substance of a credible border policy.
There is also an unmistakable political attraction in Atiku’s promise. With the 2027 election approaching, appealing directly to traders and border communities offers a politically convenient message: remove the restrictions and revive commerce.
But presidential policy cannot be reduced to what sounds attractive during an election campaign.
Atiku has every right to challenge the policies of the present administration and offer an alternative. Indeed, criticism of government policy is an essential part of democratic politics. But a presidential candidate should also be expected to explain how his alternative would work, what it would cost and what safeguards would protect the wider national interest.
Nigeria needs more legitimate trade with its neighbours, not less. It needs better border infrastructure, faster clearance, simpler procedures and stronger regional integration. None of these requires abandoning the government’s responsibility to regulate what enters the country.
The better approach is to make legitimate trade easier without making illegal trade easier.
That means technology-driven customs procedures, transparent documentation, efficient border infrastructure, predictable charges and risk-based inspections. Traders who comply with the law should encounter fewer obstacles; those who deliberately evade it should not be allowed to gain an unfair advantage.
Atiku’s 2027 proposal should therefore be judged not by the emotional appeal of “reopening the borders” but by the policy behind the slogan.
If he believes the present system is unnecessarily restrictive, he should identify the specific restrictions he intends to remove. If he believes legitimate border trade is being suffocated, he should explain how he would formalise and facilitate it without encouraging smuggling. And if security controls are to be relaxed in particular areas, he should explain how the resulting risks would be managed.
That is the level of debate Nigerians should expect from someone seeking the presidency, especially one like him that was a very senior Customs officer.
The danger is that, in the rush to distinguish himself politically ahead of 2027, Atiku may be offering a simple answer to a problem that is anything but simple. Border communities need economic opportunities, but Nigeria also needs revenue, lives and economic protection, regulatory compliance and national security. These interests are not mutually exclusive.
Atiku’s ambition to return to the presidency is legitimate. But the pursuit of that ambition should not turn border policy into a political bargaining chip.
The question Nigerians should ultimately ask is not whether the borders should be “opened”. It is whether Atiku’s proposal would expand legitimate trade while protecting Nigeria’s economic and security interests—or simply loosen rules that exist for a political reason.
That is the real issue behind the 2027 border promise.
