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Nigeria Customs Recruitment, Federal Character Commission and the Limits of Oversight Powers 

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By Okey IBEKE

 

The decision of the Federal Character Commission (FCC) to institute criminal proceedings against the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) and its Comptroller-General, Bashir Adewale Adeniyi, over alleged violations of federal character requirements in the Service’s 2024/2025 recruitment exercise raises fundamental questions about constitutional oversight, statutory authority and institutional independence in Nigeria’s public administration.

 

Beyond the disagreement over recruitment records, shortlisted candidates and training invitations, the dispute exposes a misunderstanding of the relationship between the Federal Character Commission and other statutory institutions. It throws up the question of whether an agency established to monitor equitable representation in public employment can extend its authority to controlling the recruitment, screening, professional assessment and operational decisions of another institution.

 

The answer to this question hinges on the Constitution and respective enabling legislations of the two organisations. Viewed from this perspective, Customs has substantial legal and institutional grounds to challenge any attempt by the Commission to exercise powers beyond monitoring and enforcing compliance with federal character requirements.

 

No one is contesting the Commission’s mandate over ensuring geographical spread in recruitments of federal institutions, including Customs. However, jurisdiction to monitor compliance is not the same as authority to administer recruitment. This may explain why the Commission’s intervention, particularly its reported directive to suspend Customs recruitment and training, raises serious legal questions.

 

The Nigeria Customs Service Act, 2023, provides the legal foundation for the administration and operations of the Service. It establishes a governance structure in which the Governing Board and management exercise clearly defined responsibilities.

 

Sections 10, 14 and 15 are particularly relevant. Section 14 establishes the responsibilities of the Comptroller-General and Management Committee in administering and supervising the Service. The Comptroller-General is responsible for overall management, while the Management Committee handles matters requiring professional and technical expertise and coordinates operational and administrative responsibilities.

 

More importantly, Section 15(1) empowers the Governing Board to appoint the number of officers it considers necessary for the efficient performance of the Service’s statutory functions. This provision recognises that Customs must determine its manpower requirements and recruit personnel capable of performing its specialised responsibilities.

 

The Act also expressly recognises federal character policy in specified senior appointments under Section 14(4). Customs is therefore not exempt from the constitutional principle. However, compliance with federal character does not transfer the Board’s statutory appointment authority to the Federal Character Commission.

 

The Commission cannot assume that its responsibility to monitor representation, gives it the power to determine who Customs recruits, who it disqualifies, who proceeds to training or when the Service should suspend personnel activities. Such an interpretation would create a parallel recruitment authority outside the governance structure established by the National Assembly.

 

The Constitutional Boundary of the Commission’s Authority

 

The Commission derives its authority from Section 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution and Paragraph 8 of Part I, Third Schedule. These provisions mandate the Commission to work out an equitable formula for distributing public service posts, promote and monitor compliance with federal character and take legal measures against institutions that fail to comply.

 

The Federal Character Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act, Cap F7, Laws of the Federation 2004, further provides for its functions and enforcement powers.

 

There is no dispute that these provisions also apply to Customs. The Service must ensure that recruitment opportunities are distributed equitably and that no state, ethnic group or geographical section is unfairly excluded.

 

However, the Constitution does not appoint the Commission as the personnel management authority of federal institutions. It does not confer on it the power to conduct recruitment examinations, determine professional suitability, undertake security screening or exercise disciplinary authority over Customs officers. The Commission’s function is to ensure equitable representation, not to take over the administrative responsibilities of the institutions it monitors.

 

The constitutional framework also differentiates between the Federal Character Commission and the Federal Civil Service Commission. Paragraph 11 of the Third Schedule gives the latter specific appointment and disciplinary responsibilities in relation to the Federal Civil Service, subject to constitutional exceptions. Paragraph 8 gives the FCC a different mandate centred on equitable distribution and enforcement.

 

The Commission cannot expand its jurisdiction through administrative circulars or guidelines. Its procedures must remain consistent with the Constitution and the laws governing the institutions it monitors.

 

The most contentious aspect of the dispute is the Commission’s reported insistence that Customs should have invited it to monitor recruitment and subsequently suspend training pending a review. The FCC Act empowers the Commission to demand relevant information, investigate compliance and enforce federal character requirements. These are their legitimate oversight functions, but monitoring and operational control are different legal concepts.

 

Monitoring allows the Commission to examine whether recruitment procedures and outcomes comply with federal character. It may inspect relevant documents, request information, assess state and zonal representation and investigate complaints of discrimination.

 

Operational control involves determining how an institution performs its internal responsibilities, including candidate selection, professional assessment, security vetting and deployment. Nothing in Paragraph 8 of the Third Schedule expressly transfers these responsibilities to the Commission.

 

The Commission’s reliance on Section 4(1)(e) of its enabling Act also requires careful interpretation. That provision contemplates intervention in the operation of a federal agency, subject to presidential approval and the statutory conditions specified, where relevant functions are not being effectively implemented.

 

It cannot reasonably be interpreted as an unrestricted authority to suspend another federal agency’s operations without presidential approval, whenever the Commission is dissatisfied with its recruitment process.

 

If the Commission believes Customs has violated federal character requirements, it has investigative and enforcement options, including recourse to the courts, which it has belatedly done. It must establish the legal basis for any directive and demonstrate that the statutory conditions for exercising the power have been satisfied. A constitutional commission cannot convert its monitoring responsibilities into general administrative supervision over another statutory institution.

 

The technical and security character of Customs places its recruitment criteria and procedures on a different oversight level.

Under Section 4 of its Act, the Service is responsible for revenue collection, trade facilitation, prevention of smuggling, customs enforcement and protection of national economic interests. Section 6 further gives Customs officers the powers, authorities and privileges of police officers for enforcing the Act.

 

Its personnel serve at international airports, seaports, land borders, intelligence formations, anti-smuggling units, investigation departments and other strategic locations. Recruitment must therefore consider integrity, professional competence, physical and psychological suitability, security clearance and the ability to discharge enforcement responsibilities.

 

A candidate may satisfy general educational requirements but fail subsequent medical, documentary or security assessments, and inclusion in an initial shortlist does not automatically guarantee final enlistment.

 

Federal character should ensure that qualified Nigerians from different parts of the country have equitable opportunities. It should not compel Customs to appoint unsuitable candidates or lower standards required for national security and enforcement.

 

Modern Customs operations also involve tariff classification, customs valuation, intelligence analysis, risk management, cargo examination, post-clearance audit and revenue enforcement. These responsibilities require specialised knowledge and professional competence.

 

Section 14(7) of the NCS Act recognises the importance of professional and technical expertise in the management of the Service. Recruitment decisions must therefore remain within the statutory governance structure, subject to constitutional requirements and lawful oversight.

 

Another important consideration is the confidentiality of information handled by Customs.

The Service maintains sensitive intelligence relating to smuggling networks, trafficking routes, organised criminal activities and cross-border threats. Sections 23 and 26 of the NCS Act recognise its obligation to protect confidential information acquired in performing its duties.

 

The Commission’s authority to demand recruitment information must therefore be exercised with due regard to these obligations. There is a different between providing the number of successful candidates from each state, the distribution of vacancies and aggregate recruitment outcomes, and granting unrestricted access to individual security assessments, intelligence reports and confidential background investigations.

 

It’s also important that Customs provide information necessary to establish federal character compliance, but disclosure must be controlled and consistent with the confidentiality provisions of its enabling legislation.

 

The Commission’s allegation of criminal liability against Comptroller-General, Bashir Adewale Adeniyi is not supported by the reality. Since his assumption of office, Adeniyi has demonstrated a conscious commitment to geographical and zonal balance, challenging any suggestion that the current Customs leadership is indifferent to federal character.

 

Under Adeniyi, attention has been given to maintaining geographical balance in promotions, postings, appointments to management positions, deployment of officers across commands and access to professional training opportunities. This approach recognises that the Customs Service, as a national institution, must provide officers from different parts of the country opportunities for career progression, professional development and participation in strategic management.

 

The importance of this commitment cannot be overstated as Customs operates through commands and formations distributed across Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. Providing officers from different geographical backgrounds opportunities to occupy management positions, serve in strategic commands and participate in professional development strengthens institutional inclusion and national cohesion.

 

It also demonstrates that geographical representation and professional competence need not be competing objectives. An institution can maintain equitable representation while insisting on merit, discipline, integrity and operational suitability. The Commission should therefore distinguish between a genuine failure to comply with constitutional requirements and disagreements over how an institution administers its personnel.

 

One of the allegations of the court case filed by the Commission against the Service, concerns failure to provide nominal rolls and recruitment records. The Commission must establish the precise information requested, its statutory entitlement to that information and whether Customs unlawfully withheld it. There is a clear difference between a nominal roll of serving officers and records relating to prospective recruits. The Commission must identify what was required and demonstrate how the alleged failure constitutes the offence charged.

 

The second count alleges that Customs failed to invite the Commission to monitor recruitment. The question is whether the monitoring obligation relied upon was properly grounded in law and whether the Service deliberately obstructed a lawful exercise of the Commission’s constitutional responsibilities.

 

The third allegation concerns continuation of training despite the Commission’s directive to suspend the exercise. This is perhaps the most important jurisdictional contention. A request to preserve records and cooperate with an investigation is different from an instruction to suspend the statutory operations of another institution. The Commission must establish the precise legal provision authorising its directive and demonstrate that all statutory conditions were satisfied as it cannot assume that its administrative instruction is binding merely because it’s issued.

 

The fourth count concerns failure to provide clear eligibility criteria and comprehensive recruitment guidelines. This must be addressed by actual recruitment documents, including advertisements, eligibility requirements, examination arrangements, screening procedures and selection protocols.

 

Customs publicly announced recruitment procedures and participation requirements. The Commission must establish precisely what was missing and why the information supplied was legally inadequate.

 

Furthermore, the Comptroller-General’s personal criminal liability cannot be inferred simply from his position as head of the Service. Section 15(2) of the FCC Act requires proof of reckless, negligent or wilful acquiescence in the relevant offence. Such responsibility must be established through evidence, not presumed from administrative designation.

 

The Danger of Institutional Overreach

 

The larger concern is the precedent this dispute could establish. If the Federal Character Commission can exercise operational control over Customs recruitment simply by invoking its monitoring mandate, other statutory institutions could face similar interference in their responsibilities. The result could be fragmented accountability, competing administrative authorities and weakened professional standards.

 

Customs cannot be held accountable for the operational performance of its officers if its statutory recruitment responsibilities are effectively transferred to another institution. The Commission should monitor representation, investigate discrimination and enforce compliance, while Customs retain responsibility for professional screening, security vetting, training, appointment and deployment. These responsibilities are complementary, not interchangeable.

 

Customs should also not approach this controversy as a personal confrontation between the Comptroller-General and the Commission’s leadership, rather, it should defend its statutory authority through a documented legal and administrative response. The Commission, on its part, must recognise that its constitutional authority has boundaries as its mandate does not make it the recruitment board, training command or personnel management authority of the Nigeria Customs Service.

 

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Customs should comply with federal character. It must. The contention is whether enforcement of that principle should override the statutory governance, professional independence and security responsibilities of a specialised national institution.

 

Okey IBEKE is a Lagos based Public Affairs Analyst.

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